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THE VOTING RIGHTS PARADOX: IDEOLOGY
AND INCOMPLETENESS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE
Atiba R. Ellis*
This Essay describes the “voting rights paradox”—the fact
that despite America’s professed commitment to universal
enfranchisement, voting rights legislation throughout U.S.
history has arisen in some states to serve antidemocratic,
exclusionary ends. This Essay argues that this contradiction
comes into focus when the right to vote is understood as having
as an ideological driving force based on worthiness for
admission to the franchise. This ideology of worthiness persists
because the right to vote is dependent on political decisions left
to the political branches and the majority’s willingness to allow
propaganda to influence the scope of the franchise.
Ultimately, this Essay argues that the voting rights paradox
is effectively the “invisible hand” influencing the American law
of democracy. The only way out of the paradox is to reorient
voting rights towards a communitarian conception that fosters
an authentic understanding of a universalist right to vote. This
must be expressed by (and coupled with) fundamental,
structural transformations in the mechanisms for allowing
citizens to exercise their voting rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A central paradox has plagued and continues to plague the
American right to vote: the American republic has always
conditioned participation in the democratic process on an
antidemocratic ideology of worthiness needed to exercise the rights
of citizenship. This reality has shaped debates around the right to
vote in the past and in the present and has made it more difficult
for the law to embrace the rhetoric of a universal right to vote—that
is, a right for all citizens to participate freely and fairly.
This is the defining dilemma of voting rights in American history.
Indeed, the histories surrounding voting rights admit to the
progress that was required to gain a more expansive right to vote
for all American citizens, yet at the same time recognize that these
rights are inherently and constantly contested.1 The continued
contest around voting rights is ultimately attributable to this
paradox.
This paradox—and the underlying constitutional flaws that
allow it to exist—is the subject of this Essay. My claim is that,
despite the significant strides towards a universal right to vote, this
paradox—created by the interrelationship of deferential and
malleable notions of the right to vote, coupled with the ability to
condition the franchise on tests intended to allow targeted,
exclusionary discrimination—exists and continues to define voting
rights battles today. Limits on the franchise will persist until an
authentically universalist view of the right to vote prevails in
American election law. Wholesale structural change is the only way
to break out of this paradox.
Our understanding of the possibilities for expansive voting rights
must necessarily be read through this voting rights paradox. This
inherently political force—the ability to condition the franchise on
the ideological measure I am calling “worthiness”—shapes every
conversation about the nature of voting rights. Throughout
American history, efforts at creating a genuine, universalist right to
See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (exploring the history of voting rights in the United
States and the factors causing their expansion and contraction); William Jefferson Clinton,
The Voting Rights Umbrella, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383 (2015) (noting that while suffrage
has expanded throughout the country’s history, it is presently becoming harder for people to
vote due to restrictive state voting requirements).
1
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vote have been consistently stymied by this worthiness measure.
Indeed, an individual’s ability to vote has consistently been
determined by whether they meet some ideologically driven criteria,
whether it be white supremacy, patriarchy, class dominance,
nativism, or some other hierarchy. The particular ideologies (and
their respective public acceptability) have evolved over time, and,
importantly, the rise of these ideologies often intersects with times
when the franchise has expanded in response to modern norms of
equality and universal participation. The evolution of exclusionary
rhetoric has obscured voter suppression rationales and thus has
insulated exclusionary actions from significant scrutiny.2
This problem has manifested throughout American history. The
structures of the original U.S. Constitution and state constitutions
codified the relationship between worthiness and the conditional
right to vote; these constitutions either explicitly or implicitly
denied the right to vote based on identity well into the twentieth
century.3 The paradox affects the framing of the constitutional
amendments and statutory law that sought to expand the franchise,
which were not given complete effect, and in some ways, were never
given complete effect.4 And it persists in the creation and
interpretation of the laws at all levels through the lens of partisan
epistemology—the idea that different political parties have
different ecospheres of knowledge and opinions based on that
knowledge5 and “outcome determinative” election law design.6 This
era of partisan epistemology, and the fundamental divide it creates
regarding the validity of voter fraud claims, structures our current
era of vote suppression. The premise of all forms of voter
2 See Atiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 879, 911 (2014)
(describing the antidemocratic effects of meme-driven policy, including distortion that
degrades the mechanisms of voting and confidence in the electoral system).
3 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,
95–105 (2014) (describing how the federal and state constitutions allocate the franchise).
4 See Charles S. Bullock III, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Justin Wert, Electoral College Reform
and Voting Rights, 1 FAULKNER L. REV. 89, 123–24 (2009) (comparing “first order
constitutional limitations to voting procedures” with “second order statutory and doctrinal
regulations, created by Congress and the federal judiciary”).
5 I describe this divide and recent research relevant thereto in Atiba R. Ellis, Voter Fraud
as an Epistemic Crisis for the Right to Vote, 71 MERCER L. REV. 757, 758 (2020) (describing,
as part of the epistemic divide in America, the phenomenon of divisions around knowledge
based upon political affiliation).
6 David Schultz, The Case for a Democratic Theory of American Election Law, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 259, 259–60 (2016).
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suppression is the commitment to ideologically driven standards of
worthiness for admission to the franchise and the majority’s
willingness to allow propaganda to influence decisions concerning
who is worthy to participate in the franchise.
This Essay will discuss the paradox of “worthiness” as a standard
for democracy and expose it as a fundamental problem for American
democracy. The Essay will discuss how this phenomenon has
evolved and continues to perpetuate voter suppression by reflecting
upon the less-than-complete progress of voting rights during the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In doing so, it will elucidate
the problems of antidemocratic constitutional design, the
predominance of so-called “identity politics” in shaping voting
rights, and the sway that ideology (notably, “partisan
epistemology”) has on our modern debates.
In Part II, this Essay uses the seminal case of Shelby County v.
Holder7 to focus on the political theme at the heart of this thesis—
i.e., the fact that the American democratic structure allows voting
rights to be treated as a political question. Then, in Part III, this
Essay provides an account of how “worthiness” as an ideological
commitment delegates to political actors (who are motivated by the
desire to condition the franchise on meeting a measure of
worthiness) the power to determine who holds the franchise in
democracy. Part IV further explores this paradox by reflecting on
the history of racial voter suppression in the United States. Then,
Part V argues that because the paradox is an intrinsic part of
American democracy, a reconsideration of the first premise of our
democracy to insulate from this paradox is necessary to achieve a
truly universal right to vote. Part VI concludes.

II. A POLITICAL QUESTION: SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER AND
THE DILEMMA OF VOTING RIGHTS
The debate over voting rights is intrinsically linked to the power
that the body politic has to define itself. Thus, questions of the
legitimacy of an individual’s participation in elections are
intrinsically tied to the political legitimacy of the decisions made by
the body politic to determine who gets to participate in the

7

570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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franchise.8 This, in itself, is the paradox of American democracy.9 Of
course, the consequence of this paradox is that the conversation over
who is—and who is not—a legitimate participant in the franchise is
left to the majority itself. And those questions, in the American
structure, are then delegated to the representatives of the people,
as well as to the courts.10 Thus, an expression of the voting rights
paradox is the dilemma created when the majoritarian and countermajoritarian forces of American government conflict over the scope
of voting rights based on their competing normative and political
commitments.
This dilemma was made explicit in a recent case shaping the
scope of modern American voting rights, Shelby County v. Holder.11
This decision reveals aspects of the voting rights paradox: a
commitment to conditioning the franchise based upon arguably
ideological measures; the effect of deference to state law, rather

8 See Schultz, supra note 6, at 261 (arguing that “democratic theory of election law” is
needed to “guide[] important questions such as who gets to participate, who runs for office, or
how votes are counted”).
9 This presumes that the ultimate goal of American democracy is to be, in a word,
democratic. Our conception of democracy is based on the equality of all citizens. See, e.g.,
Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the Post-Civil
Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789, 790–91 [hereinafter Ellis, Reviving the Dream]
(noting that equality is “axiomatic” to conceptions of democracy). To be clear, my view on this
contention is that this should be the goal of American democracy. Accordingly, ideas that
justify exclusion must be closely interrogated. See Atiba R. Ellis, Tiered Personhood and the
Excluded Voter, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 490 (2015) [hereinafter Ellis, Tiered Personhood]
(“In short, we modern Americans proceed from the assumption that democracy and
exclusivity [of the franchise] not only can co-exist, but that they must co-exist in order to
preserve the political community. We must uproot this assumption.”). As this Essay will
show, our rhetoric around democracy in the modern age has been about the equality of
citizens and equal access to the franchise. But our history shows that this has never been the
case. Particularly, prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), America had
never provided a full right to vote for all eligible citizens. Even after the passage of the VRA,
some people occasionally argue that not all citizens should be entitled to voting rights or that
the conditions on voting rights should be based on some form of determination of worth or
utility. To take one example that is more philosophical than enmeshed in the history of
America’s politics of identity, see, e.g., Jason Brennan, The Right to Vote Should Be Restricted
to Those With Knowledge, AEON (Sept. 29, 2016), https://aeon.co/ideas/the-right-to-voteshould-be-restricted-to-those-with-knowledge.
10 See Schultz, supra note 6, at 261 (noting the courts’ general role in shaping American
democracy).
11 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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than to a national standard; and the exclusionary effects of doing
so.12
In Shelby County, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a fivejustice majority, struck down as unconstitutional Section 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.13 Section 4(b) provided the formula for
determining which states had a history of racial discrimination in
voting and lagging metrics concerning the participation of minority
voters sufficient to require that the jurisdiction’s voting laws be
subject to federal government oversight.14 Section 5 of the VRA, in
contrast, is the supervision provision.15 This Section of the VRA
required states which fit the criteria under Section 4(b) to have all
of their election laws “precleared” (that is, approved by the federal
government before they are enforced within that state).16 The
standard for receiving preclearance was whether the election
provision was “retrogressive” regarding minority voting rights—i.e.,
whether the provision made racial minorities worse off in exercising
the right to vote.17 This effectively meant that states subject to
preclearance had to cooperate with the federal government to
ensure that minority voting rights were protected.18 And because of
the preclearance provision, the retrogressive effect of the laws
would not harm the targeted voters until any dispute about their
legality was settled by the Department of Justice or a federal
court.19 In this way, the preclearance requirements ultimately
prevented discrimination and forestalled backsliding in regard to
minority voting rights.20
12 See, e.g., id. at 543 (“States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and
pursuing legislative objectives.”).
13 See id. at 557 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula . . . but did not do so.
Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare §4(b) unconstitutional.”).
14 See id. at 537–39 (describing the VRA’s coverage formula).
15 See id. at 535 (stating that states covered by Section 4’s formula are “required . . . to
obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting”).
16 Id. at 544.
17 See id. at 537–38 (describing the preclearance standard under Section 5).
18 See id. at 537 (“Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect
until it was approved by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.—either the Attorney
General or a court of three judges.”).
19 See id. at 544 (“States must beseech the Federal Government for permission to
implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact . . . on their own . . . .”).
20 See id. at 565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The VRA has directly caused significant
progress in eliminating first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked increase
in minority voter registration and turnout and the number of minority elected officials.”).
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In striking down the Section 4(b) coverage formula, Chief Justice
Roberts effectively nullified this entire scheme.21 Thus, no state can
be supervised under Section 5, no matter the racial disparities
created by their modern practices.22 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned
that the South had changed sufficiently regarding race and
elections by pointing towards increased rates of voter participation
and the number of minority officials elected in Alabama and other
states.23 As I have argued elsewhere, this selective determination of
the facts amounted to offering a misleading post-racial vision of
improvement in the South that misrepresented the scope of the
problem of race and elections.24 Yet, as Chief Justice Roberts
rationalized, Congress had not changed the coverage formula in
response to that evolution.25 Thus, by maintaining a decades-old
coverage formula, the law offended “equal sovereignty” between the
states since some states subject to Section 5 preclearance had their
authority to administer their election laws suspended while other
states did not.26 Because of this mismatch between the post-racial
America that Chief Justice Roberts saw and the race-centered
mechanism that denied states equal sovereignty, the Court nullified
the VRA’s coverage formula, rendering Section 5 inoperative.27
Justice Ginsburg in dissent showed how Roberts’s post-racial
vision of America ignores the ongoing crisis of voter suppression.28
Ginsburg argued that Roberts’s depiction of race is based on a false

Id. at 556–57 (majority opinion).
See id. at 550 (“The provisions of § 5 apply only to those jurisdictions singled out by § 4.”).
23 See id. at 547–49 (describing the improvements made in the South).
24 See e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Shelby Co. v. Holder: The Crippling of the Voting Rights Act, ACS:
EXPERT FORUM (June 27, 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/shelby-co-v-holder-thecrippling-of-the-voting-rights-act/ (arguing that the Shelby majority offered an “incomplete
picture of racial triumph [that] ignores the political realities of modern voter suppression
tactics and their racial impact”); Atiba R. Ellis, Mission Accomplished? Post-Racialism and
Shelby County, ACS: EXPERT FORUM (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/
mission-accomplished-post-racialism-and-shelby-county/ (noting that the premise of
Roberts’s opinion is that Section 5 “has triumphed over the problem of race” such that voter
suppression “no longer exists”).
25 See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 554 (“Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape
a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based on
40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”).
26 Id. at 544.
27 Id. at 556–57.
28 See id. at 563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the VRA “has not eliminated all
vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority citizens”).
21
22
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premise—merely because some measures of minority participation
have improved does not disprove the existence of rampant voter
suppression or the fact that minority political participation is
severely endangered.29 Moreover, Ginsburg made clear that
Congress acts within its core constitutional role when using its
power under the Reconstruction Amendments to address racial
voter suppression.30 Indeed, she criticized Roberts’s concept of the
“equal sovereignty” of the states, as rooted in an expansive notion
of state-focused equal dignity, as nonsensical.31 The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments by design grant the federal government
express power to curtail racial discrimination in voting by
“appropriate legislation” at the expense of state sovereignty.32
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the ultimate end of these
constitutional amendments and the VRA is to protect the dignity of
the voter in not being hampered from participating in elections.33 To
illustrate this, she recited in great detail the record of racial voter
suppression amassed by Congress as a basis for reauthorizing
Section 5 in 2006.34 She described specific instances of voter
suppression against voters of color in granular detail and the efforts
spurred by Section 5 to limit these abuses.35 She echoed the
bipartisan consensus in Congress around the salience of this
problem and the solution that it chose to continue.36
The differing opinions of Roberts and Ginsburg have been
written about at length, and they clearly illustrate the terms of the
battle over voting rights. But Justice Ginsburg’s dissent contains an
important premise that points to the inherent voting rights
29 See id. at 578–79 (noting that “racially polarized voting” in the covered jurisdictions
“increases the vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory changes in voting law”).
30 Id. at 567–68.
31 See id. at 587–88 (noting that equal sovereignty principle, based on Court precedent,
applies only to the terms on which states are admitted to the Union and that “[f]ederal
statutes that treat States disparately are hardly novelties”).
32 Id. at 559–60 (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV).
33 See id. at 567 (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment “targets precisely and only racial
discrimination in voting rights”).
34 See id. at 573 (“The number of discriminatory changes blocked or deterred by the
preclearance requirement suggests that the state of voting rights in the covered jurisdictions
would have been significantly different absent this remedy.”).
35 See id. at 573–75 (outlining “characteristic examples of changes blocked [by
preclearance] in the years leading up to the 2006 reauthorization”).
36 See id. at 593 (“Congress reauthorized the VRA, including the coverage provision, with
overwhelming bipartisan support.”).
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paradox. On the most basic level, Justice Ginsburg warned that the
most democratically legitimate intervention against racial voter
suppression must be political.37 In essence, voter suppression is a
political problem that must be addressed by political solutions.
Indeed, Ginsburg’s dissent quotes Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s decision in Giles v. Harris, where, over a century ago, the
Court upheld Alabama’s notorious racial voter suppression
scheme.38 Holmes observed that the problem of white voters denying
African Americans the right to vote was ultimately a political
problem that requires a political solution.39 To quote Ginsburg:
As Justice Holmes explained: If “the great mass of the
white population intends to keep the blacks from
voting,” “relief from [that] great political wrong, if done,
as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself,
must be given by them or by the legislative and political
department of the government of the United States.”40
Of course, the irony of Justice Ginsburg quoting Justice Holmes’s
dicta in Giles is that Holmes made this argument while dismissing
a claim that the Alabama electoral system was discriminating
against African Americans.41 In this sense, Holmes disclaimed the
Court’s responsibility for remedying alleged wrongs regarding
racial voter suppression, to the extent he even recognized that a
claim would have been salient in the first place.42 The irony, then,
is that over a century later, Holmes’s words—which were meant to
justify the Court’s ambivalence towards racial discrimination—
37 See id. at 590 (“Given a record replete with examples of denial or abridgment of a
paramount federal right, the Court should have left the matter . . . in Congress’ bailiwick.”).
38 Id. at 561 (citing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903)).
39 Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
40 Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Giles, 189 U.S. at 488)).
41 See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488 (“Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State
by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would
be an empty form.”).
42 The Giles opinion is infamous for this summary dismissal of allegations of racial voter
suppression at the beginning of the Jim Crow era. As a leading casebook recognized, Giles
“signaled that[] the Fifteenth Amendment notwithstanding, the Supreme Court would not
intervene” to stop racial voter suppression. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN,
RICHARD H. PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 47 (5th ed. 2016).
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were used to criticize an opinion of the Court that is arguably
ambivalent towards a new era of racial discrimination in voting.43
Yet, Ginsburg’s recognition that Holmes was essentially correct
points to a truth of our system that is at the heart of the voting
rights paradox: the concern of racial political equality in the United
States is a political question to be answered by the political
branches.44 And for that essential question to be left to politics
leaves the meaning of democracy to the forces of inequitable
majoritarianism—or, as Lani Guinier put it, to “tyranny by The
Majority.”45
43 See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 559–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that, without
Section 5 preclearance, “backsliding” will occur).
44 This question implicates the insight of Derrick Bell and his observation that the history
of discrimination against racial minorities in voting and elections is one of “democratic
domination.” DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 6.1, at 341 (6th ed. 2008).
Indeed, this history of the white majority, which has been informed by an ideology of white
supremacy and which has had the discretion to give voting rights to the racial minority and
to condition the extension of those rights on the political deliberations of the representatives
of that majority, appears consistent with Bell’s theory of “interest convergence.” See Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 526 (1980) (arguing that “the convergence of black and white interests” in
promoting racial equality was a driver of the Brown v. Board of Education decision). Indeed,
as Bell argued, and as Mary L. Dudziak has shown, that consensus was driven not by a
fundamental recognition of the need for political equality but by the need to prevent the
debasement of America’s status in the world as an apartheid democracy. See id. at 524 (“[T]he
decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist
countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.”); Mary L. Dudziak,
Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 34 (2004) (“Cold War concerns provided a
motive beyond equality itself for the federal government, including the president and the
courts, to act on civil rights when it did.”). In this sense, Justice Ginsburg’s citation would
seem to suggest that the imposition of equal rights through legislative choice represents
another instance of interest convergence driven by politics rather than a commitment to
authentic universalism. Moreover, it points to the voting rights paradox in that it suggests
that the majority may own the democracy on whatever terms it chooses—including
discriminatory ones—and one must depend on the majority itself to change its mind about its
antidemocratic choices. That it did, and Ginsburg depends on this shift with regards to the
VRA, is beside the point. The point is that authentic democratic practice that is tied to
antidemocratic political opportunism is the background of the American experience; thus, the
expansion of the franchise will continue to be contested due to this force. This should give
pause to anyone who would argue that the expansion of voting rights is in some way
inevitable.
45 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 6 (1994) (“‘[I]t is no fair’ if a fixed, tyrannical majority excludes
or alienates the minority. It is no fair if a fixed, tyrannical majority monopolizes all the power
all the time. It is no fair if we engage in the periodic ritual of elections, but only the permanent
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III. WORTHINESS AND THE FRANCHISE
The political dilemma, and the voting rights paradox embedded
in it, are not artifacts limited to the Shelby County era, or even to
the Jim Crow period, of which Giles v. Harris is exemplary.46 The
structure of the American franchise has always suffered from this
voting rights paradox: the right to vote within American democracy
has been, and arguably continues to be, treated as a political
question which the voting majority determines. This paradox is
embedded in the structure of American constitutionalism and,
accordingly, may require revisiting that structure to fix it.
This Part explores this structural dilemma by demonstrating
how structure, from the founding of the republic to the present day,
effectively has allowed ideology to serve as the measuring device for
exercising the franchise. The roots of this are based in the deference
our constitutional structure accords to states to determine the right
to vote, while at the same time allowing societal notions of
worthiness (based upon identity-driven standards) to serve as the
measure for creating the standards for voting rights.47 And while
the right to vote may have evolved to exclude barriers explicitly
about identity, status, or other measures, the ideology (and the
attendant exclusionary effects) persists in American electoral
structures.48
From the American colonial project to the present day, politicians
have used worthiness as a standard to structure the democratic
process to exclude the voters they saw as unworthy and to include
the voters they deemed worthy.49 Politicians in the United States
are afforded this opportunity because state governments largely
decide election rules in the first instance, including who gets to vote,
how voters may access the ballot, how votes are counted, and how

majority gets to choose who is elected. Where we have tyranny by The Majority, we do not
have genuine democracy.”).
46 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
47 Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 364, 380 (2014).
48 See Kate Slater, What Is Systemic Racism?, TODAY (Feb. 4, 2021, 2:49 PM),
https://www.today.com/tmrw/what-systemic-racism-t207878 (defining systemic racism and
its effects).
49 See Ben Cady & Tom Glazer, Voters Strike Back: Litigating Against Modern Voter
Intimidation, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 215–27 (2015) (listing common voter
intimidation techniques).
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much a vote is worth in relation to other votes.50 These process
questions determine whether a citizen can vote and what the worth
of each individual vote will be. They are fundamental to the working
of our democracy, yet they are subject to the ideological forces that
treat potential constraints on democracy as “political” questions.
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the U.S.
Constitution began to constrain states with regards to how they
chose to admit or deny participation in the franchise.51 While the
constitutional norms of equality and antidiscrimination contained
in the Reconstruction Amendments are all relatively modern
inventions to ensure fair participation—and while those inventions
have been, to varying degrees, enforced by the courts—states
nonetheless have retained great capacity to legislate voter
qualifications.52
To this end, politicians have deployed rhetorical and ideological
constructs to shape the contours of the American political
community. In other words, politicians and lawmakers have argued
that certain populations are worthy or unworthy to exercise the
franchise because of traits of their identity, whether they be the
population’s race, ethnic origin, gender, or wealth.53 In this sense,
the use of rhetoric to shape public perception—that is, to shape
ideology—serves a key role in determining the nature of the
franchise. This is how lawmakers have answered the political
question of democratic inclusion throughout American history: by
excluding those who do not meet their standard of worthiness.54
This ideology of worthiness serves to justify various legal
structures that have shaped the contours of the franchise. In this
sense, those in power determine who is worthy of membership in

50 See Douglas, supra note 3, at 101–05 (describing state constitutional voting protections
across the country).
51 Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm
(last visited June 5, 2021).
52 See C.R. White, Note, Voting Rights – Ownership of Property No Longer a Valid
Qualification, 23 SW. L.J. 964, 965–67 (1969) (outlining states’ capacity to “prescribe” voter
qualifications despite the Reconstruction Amendments’ limitations).
53 See Ellis, supra note 2, at 894–98 (describing the history of exclusions from the franchise
in the United States).
54 See, e.g., id. at 895 (“For example, antebellum period social order dictated that propertied
white men were effective members of society, implicitly excluding many of those who did not
possess those characteristics.”).
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the political community, and then they deploy the vicious voter
myth to justify the exclusion of those deemed unworthy.55 And,
ironically, this exclusion and the antidemocratic impact of that
exclusion reinforces the myth itself. The use of the ideology of
worthiness in shaping the franchise has been a constant in
American history.56
The ideology of worthiness has not only served as a cudgel of
exclusion, it has also provided political cover for those seizing power
within the democratic republic. Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, allegations of election disfunction due to the
malfeasance of political party bosses, election workers, and other
direct participants continued to exist.57 Yet, oftentimes this
malfeasance was accepted as normal, and indeed, was accepted as
necessary to reinforce the worthiness standard and to maintain
political power.
Within the context of Jim Crow laws, for example, poor white
voters were also disenfranchised for their inability to pay poll taxes
or pass literacy tests.58 Yet such voters were only excluded until
their votes were needed by the dominant political structure.59
Accordingly, the public tolerated vote buying, poll tax payments
designed to subvert the system, and outright disregard of the
requirements only if the establishment was put at stake.60 And, of
55 See id. (“Exclusion was often based on irrational characteristics specifically tied to the
prevailing social order.”).
56 See id. at 897 (“The memeplex of exclusion . . . evolved through a formalistic approach to
voting laws that had disparate impacts on racial groups and the poor.”).
57 See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an
Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2009)
(describing types of voter fraud that have occurred in American elections).
58 See David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming
of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 484 (2008) (“[A]fter
the Civil War, many Southerners used Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather
laws, and not so subtle means, such as lynchings, cross burnings, and other techniques to
prevent newly freed slaves from voting.”).
59 See Ellis, supra note 2, at 897 (“Powerful white Americans ensured that . . . poor whites
whom would otherwise fail a literacy test or be unable to pay a poll tax, would: (1) be
exempt from these requirements; (2) have enough political backing to meet the requirements;
or (3) simply have the requirements waived outright.”).
60 See DONALD A. DEBATS, VOTE BUYING IN NINETEENTH CENTURY US ELECTIONS 10
(2016),
http://sociallogic.iath.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/BeforeSecret-Buying.pdf
(“[C]harges of vote-buying, corruption and stolen elections are, and were, almost always selfserving. As is the case today, those who make the charge of voter fraud are often seeking to
change the electoral rules and those who seek to change the rules often allege voter fraud.”).
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course, this was not limited to the Jim Crow South. Similar
“machines” such as New York’s Tammany Hall and the famous
Chicago political machine practiced systemic election fraud in the
North.61 Such fraud was countenanced as part of a tactic of
preservation from the danger of vicious threats to the political
establishment coupled with a desire to maintain power. Thus,
notions of virtue and vice within political culture served
instrumentalist ends: “virtuous” voters supported the political
establishment, and “vicious” voters were threats to it.
Through this lens, the twenty-first century debates about voter
fraud and the demand for policies like voter identification laws,
voter purges, and in-person-only voting take a more nuanced
meaning.62 These policies are inextricably linked to the history of
the use of pretext to discriminate against subordinated groups in
the political process. Thus, we can understand these policies as
efforts to use moralistic rhetoric to substitute democratic ideals with
an authoritarianism of the “worthy.” Similarly, there has been
partisan manipulation of the political process in order to win, and
the question of whether there is voter fraud and what to do about it
is inextricable from these partisan power grabs.63 Thus,
unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud not only criminalize and
demean voters, but they also tend to distort democratic legitimacy
of the electoral process in the name of an election integrity that is
discredited for its lack of inclusiveness.
Moreover, such appeals to virtuousness of the vote and
viciousness of certain voters are means to coalesce identity-based
groups. Fitting certain citizens within the category of “vicious”
voters and fitting others as implicitly “virtuous” justifies ideologies
of gender, racial, and alienage subordination. The vicious voter
61 See Tammany Hall, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/uspolitics/tammany-hall (“Tammany Hall became known for charges of corruption levied
against leaders such as William M. ‘Boss’ Tweed.”).
62 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 58, at 492–93 (“Efforts to tighten restrictions on AfricanAmerican franchise rights after the Civil War and upon urban, immigrant, and poor voters
during the Populist and Progressive eras were ostensibly to combat election fraud, even
though . . . there was little hard evidence to support the rumors and allegations that this type
of corruption was systematic.” (footnotes omitted)).
63 See id. at 531 (“Like the first wave at the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of the
Twentieth Centuries, which augmented the fear of voter fraud as a way to disenfranchise
African-Americans, ex-felons, urban poor, and ethnic populations, the new
disenfranchisement uses similar fears to accomplish the same today.”).
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myth directly interacts with these entrenched forms of identity
politics to form a framework of intersectional hierarchy creation
that shapes our notions of citizenship and how society ought to be
structured. Narratives about racial subordination and the right to
vote capture much of this, but this Essay hopes to expand our
understanding by bringing a broader intersectional lens to accounts
of voter suppression and the identity formation dynamic that affects
the political community.

IV. RACE AS IDEOLOGY AS MEASURING DEVICE FOR THE
WORTHINESS OF THE FRANCHISE
The prior Part served to illustrate the enduring nature of the
American voting rights paradox. From the eras of explicit exclusion
on account of identity, to Jim Crow’s formalist exclusion of the poor
and African Americans, to the modern, post-Shelby County era of
exclusion-by-hyperregulation justified by propaganda, the voting
rights paradox of exclusionary democracy—that is, the fact that the
right to vote within American democracy has been and arguably
continues to be treated as a political question on which the voting
majority make a determination—is embedded in the structure of
American constitutionalism. Accordingly, revisiting this structure
may be required to fix it.
This Part takes a longer view of the American right to vote as
read through the lens of race and the voting rights paradox. It uses
race in particular to examine how leaving the question of the
franchise to political decisions determined by the majority allows
ideology to serve as a measuring device for determining who is and
is not worthy of exercising the franchise.
Given the danger described above of masking or avoiding the
interrelationship of racial subordination and the structure of
democracy, examining the “historical racial context” of
discrimination is necessary to elucidate issues around racism and
its interaction with the political process.64 This Part will examine
In other words, an epistemic grounding that draws on historical context and situates
modern election laws in the long trajectory of exclusion is essential to addressing problems of
modern racial vote denial. See Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial,
54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 633 (2013) (arguing for a more robust understanding of historical context
in VRA Section 2 cases); Caitlin Swain, Why the South Matters Now: The Voting Rights Act,
North Carolina, and the Long Southern Strategy, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 211
64
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the historical trends regarding race and democracy to illustrate the
source of, and the subversion of, federal intervention that lies in
tension with the structures of white supremacy.
Racial subordination has been one of the defining structures and
heuristics of the constitutional discourse around democratic
republicanism.65 Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, racial
domination is the “cornerstone fact of America.”66 In Normalizing
Domination, I argued that the history of political, racial
subordination is the legacy that we must confront as a democracy
in a race conscious way to ultimately subvert reassertions of white
supremacy.67
Indeed, this suggests that, in approaching the problem of race,
one must examine clearly the constitutional legacy of how the U.S.
Constitution was created with the purpose of reinforcing the
political economy of slavery, how its reinvention during
Reconstruction nonetheless reinforced racial subordination, and
even ultimately, in the post-formal racial subordination world, the
law of democracy is still dominated by racial subordination and
exclusions. This pattern of reemergence of forms of racial
subordination throughout each epoch shows how such ideology
reinvents and then transforms (or recalibrates) the law to allow its
existence.68
In this sense, the idea of American constitutional republicanism
has existed in tension with—and at times has enabled or has been
at odds with—racial equality. This concern is as old as the original
(2017) (arguing that an understanding of the “Long Southern Strategy” for racial vote
polarization and voter suppression will yield better understandings of the current battle over
voting rights).
65 See BELL, supra note 44, §§ 6.1–6.14 (exploring how racism has caused democratic
domination in the United States); GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL, RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY: 1607 TO PRESENT 177–205 (2d ed. 2013) (examining the history of enfranchisement
of racial minorities in the United States); GILDA R. DANIELS, UNCOUNTED: THE CRISIS OF
VOTER SUPPRESSION IN AMERICA 10 (2020) (“The efforts to enslave and depress the votes of
people of color in the 1800s, 1900s, and 2000s have a strand that connects through the
centuries . . . .”).
66 Atiba R. Ellis, Normalizing Domination, 20 CUNY L. REV. 493, 495 (2017).
67 Id. at 503–04.
68 See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (“The ways in which the legal
system enforces social stratification are various and evolve over time. Efforts to reform a
status regime bring about changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric . . . . In
short, status-enforcing state action evolves in form as it is contested.”).
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U.S. Constitution itself. The original Constitution was designed to
reinforce and enhance slavery in one of its political bases.69 The
Electoral College enhanced the political power of slaveholding
states based upon the Three-Fifths Compromise, which allowed
slaveholding states to count slaves as three-fifths of a person for
purposes of apportioning political representation.70 Thus, the
political interests of southern slaveholders were directly
represented in the House of Representatives and impacted the
election of the President of the United States.71 This, coupled with
the Fugitive Slave Clause, in turn allowed slaveholding states to
extend the economic exploitation of slavery.72
Moreover, the delegation of regulation of federal elections to the
states through the Elections Clause,73 coupled with Congress’s
reticence to use the power under the Clause to assert federal power
over the states, left the states the power to define the franchise by
whatever terms they saw fit.
These two provisions working together allowed lawmakers to use
racial caste as a way of distributing political power over the scope
of the American experiment. Even though there is evidence that free
African Americans could participate in the political process in
antebellum America,74 those who were enslaved could not.
See Wilfred Codrington III, The Electoral College’s Racist Origins, ATLANTIC (Nov. 17,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/electoral-college-racistorigins/601918/ (describing how southern framers used the Electoral College and the ThreeFifths Compromise to gain political advantages over the North).
70 See id. (“With about 93 percent of the country’s slaves toiling in just five southern states,
that region was the undoubted beneficiary of the compromise, increasing the size of the
South’s congressional delegation by 42 percent. When the time came to agree on a system for
choosing the president, it was all too easy for the delegates to resort to the [Three-Fifths
Compromise] as the foundation.”).
71 Id.
72 The Fugitive Slave Clause required that “Person[s] held to Service or Labour”—i.e.,
slaves—must be returned to their place of enslavement upon capture. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 3.
73 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”).
74 See Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Difficulty of
Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. L. REV. 181, 194–95 (2015)
(describing how African American men had the right to participate in elections at the time of
the founding of the republic, but that over the course of the early nineteenth century,
southern states eliminated the Black vote in exchange for universal white male suffrage).
69
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Moreover, in Dred Scott v. Sanford, the U.S. Supreme Court
effectively abolished all African Americans’ right to citizenship,
including the right to vote.75
Yet after the Civil War, a form of citizenship was enshrined in
the Reconstruction Amendments to undo the genesis of racial
exclusion during the antebellum period. This definition lies in the
Fourteenth Amendment,76 which builds on the Thirteenth
Amendment’s abolishment of slavery.77 Moreover, Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided an anti-voter suppression clause
designed to penalize states that stripped their population of the
right to vote.78 And given the political exigencies of the time, the
Reconstruction Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment to make
explicit the antidiscrimination principle in voting.79
While this created a moment of political equality for the recently
freed African American men, the southern redemption transformed
Reconstruction into Jim Crow racial and political subordination.
While not explicitly racialized—as prohibited by the most literal
(and least expansive) interpretation possible of the Fifteenth
Amendment80—this implicitly racialized political subordination
was implemented with regulatory burdens that were nearly
impossible for minorities, who were mostly poor, to overcome.
Indeed, in this era of “separate but equal,” this core inequality
ensured the reinvention of a slavery-like racial caste that was
unable to effectively use political power to advocate for equal
treatment.81 Thus, second-class status for African Americans

60 U.S. 393, 413 (1856) (holding that even free African Americans “were not citizens
within the meaning of the Constitution”).
76 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied
to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged . . . , the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”).
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
80 See generally Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (declaring grandfather clauses
unconstitutional as regulations of voting rights based on race).
81 For discussion, see generally BELL, supra note 44.
75
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through the black codes,82 felon disenfranchisement,83 poll taxes,84
the White primary,85 and naked political exclusion tied the roots of
mass incarceration and hyper-criminalization of the Black body to
political exclusion.86
Over the course of the thirty years between the height of
Reconstruction and the emergence of Jim Crow, the African
American male electorate was effectively destroyed. Paul
Finkelman explained that African American male political
participation during Reconstruction in the South Carolina was
estimated at 77% in 1880.87 By 1912, participation had dropped to
2%.88 This was true across the South.89
Ironically, the United States required statutory intervention to
begin to fulfill the promise of constitutional political equality for
racial minorities. The work of a half-century of political and civil
rights advocacy came to fruition through the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Section 2 of the VRA codified a remedy for
plaintiffs who suffered discrimination in voting, whether through
outright vote denial or by abridgment of the right to vote on the
basis of race through laws that have a disparate impact.90 Moreover,
Section 5 of the VRA directly intervened in the nearly unfettered
discretion that states had to diminish minority political
participation.91 Section 5 set of a system of preclearance—or
preapproval—of election laws in states that had a history of

See Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the
Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (describing the operation and impact of
Jim Crow-era voter suppression mechanisms).
83 Id. at 1024–25.
84 Id. at 1041.
85 Id. at 1031.
86 It is worth emphasizing that the problem of felon disenfranchisement is directly rooted
in, and reflective of, the larger patterns of Jim Crow disenfranchisement, and that these
practices lay the seeds for the modern problem of mass incarceration. See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010) (discussing the systemic and institutional causes of mass incarceration that
disproportionately affect African Americans).
87 Finkelman, supra note 74, at 208.
88 Id.
89 See Ellis, supra note 82, at 1044 (“The end result [of Jim Crow] was that for over sixty
years, whites of all classes could vote while poor Blacks could not.”).
90 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018).
91 See supra notes 15–17, 35 and accompanying text.
82
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discrimination against minorities in voting.92 Section 4(b) of the
VRA set the formula by which jurisdictions could qualify for Section
5 supervision.93
Yet the courts also invented new dimensions for political
equality. In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court began to implement the
idea of one person, one vote, and thus created a structure for
ensuring that each vote of each person would, at least in theory, be
weighted similarly.94 And in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, the Court abolished the poll tax in state elections under
the Equal Protection Clause,95 which, coupled with the passage of
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,96 eliminated the most pernicious
form of facially neutral but racially discriminatory election
regulations. These changes have transformed racial politics
throughout the United States.97
Yet, this landmark transformation has nonetheless been limited
in its scope and impact. This long road of limitation may well
represent a period of contraction that constitutes a third epoch of
racial discrimination. For example, the constitutional scope of the
voting rights revolution has been limited by the U.S. Supreme Court
which has required that Fifteenth Amendment claims must show
proof of purposeful discrimination, rather than just disparate
impact.98 This rationale has been extended to VRA litigation
regarding felon disenfranchisement and other forms of voter
suppression.99 Thus, intentional discrimination theories are now
See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2145 (2015) (exploring the
belief that a more robust Section 2 may take the place of the nullified Section 5 preclearance
regime).
93 See supra notes 14, 21–22 and accompanying text.
94 See 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[A]n individual’s right to vote for state legislators is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”).
95 See 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[W]ealth or fee paying has . . . no relation to voting
qualifications; the right to vote is . . . too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”).
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall
not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”).
97 See, e.g., Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 92, at 2144 (noting that the VRA has been
highly successful and inexpensive).
98 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69–70 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that
evidence of intentional discrimination is needed to find a constitutional violation).
99 See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam)
(“[P]laintiffs bringing a section 2 VRA challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law . . . must
92
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limited to when there is express evidence of racial animus, as was
exposed in Hunter v. Underwood,100 or circumstantial evidence that
strongly infers the existence of racially discriminatory policy
choices, as the Fourth Circuit held in North Carolina State
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory.101 Similarly, despite the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, in the wake of Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board,102 states may pass along indirect costs of
voting and use voter identification laws to restrict access to the
franchise.
With the heightened bar for constitutional protections from strict
voter identification laws and the maze of felon disenfranchisement
laws, the twenty-first century has seen a rise in the hyperregulation
of the vote. In itself, this parallels the elimination of African
Americans from the franchise in the mid-nineteenth century via the
undoing of Reconstruction and the promise of the Fifteenth
Amendment through poll taxes, literacy tests, and other entry
barriers. This third period of federal intervention through the VRA
nonetheless protected racial minorities from the diminution of their
voting rights.103
Additionally, access to the ballot has become increasingly
threatened due to the contraction of the VRA. In particular, and as
discussed at length earlier, in Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the aforementioned Section 4(b) of the

at least show that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that
the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.”); Simmons v. Galvin, 575
F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Congress has excepted from the reach of the VRA protections
from vote denial for claims against a state which disenfranchises incarcerated felons.”);
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the VRA does
“not encompass felon disenfranchisement laws” because of the “wealth of persuasive evidence
that Congress . . . never intended to extend the coverage of the [VRA] to felon
disenfranchisement provisions”); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1233–34 (11th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same).
100 See 471 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1985) (noting that a “zeal for white supremacy” motivated the
challenged law).
101 See 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that the challenge law was “enacted with
racially discriminatory intent” based upon circumstantial evidence).
102 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding a voter identification law).
103 In the pre-Shelby County voting rights enforcement world, Section 5 preclearance
allowed the opportunity for the federal government, or, if necessary, the courts to ensure that
proposed voting rights changes would not harm minority voters. See Ellis, Reviving the
Dream, supra note 9, at 842 & n.262 (noting that courts used Section 5 of the VRA to block
voter ID laws in South Carolina and Texas).
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VRA was unconstitutional because it failed to consider the evidence
of transformation in participation in voting that the states under
the preclearance regime had experienced.104 Chief Justice Roberts,
speaking for the majority, deemed this necessary because of the
burdens imposed on the states subject to preclearance requirements
as compared to the lack of burden on states not under the
preclearance regime.105 He crafted a narrative based on the idea
that “things have changed dramatically” regarding minority voting
rates and the number of minority officeholders.106 Justice Ginsburg
in her dissent rejected this premise as derisive of congressional
authority and as disconnected from the realities of racial voter
suppression.107
In the post-Shelby County world, states that are largely
controlled by Republican legislatures, and that were most closely
tied to the history of racial exclusion, have proceeded to implement
laws to increase the regulation of the vote. The exemplary case in
this regard is the action of the North Carolina legislature
documented in McCrory.108 In the wake of the Shelby County
decision, the Republican-controlled North Carolina legislature
redistricted its state and congressional districts109 as well as
redesigned its election regulation laws.110 In particular, the North
Carolina General Assembly redrafted voter qualification statutes at
issue in McCrory in a scheme to intentionally dismantle minoritypreferred voting practices.111 This conduct was sufficient to allow
the Fourth Circuit to determine, using circumstantial evidence, that
See supra notes 13–27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
106 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547 (2013).
107 See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
108 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[O]n the day
after the Supreme Court issued Shelby County v. Holder, eliminating preclearance
obligations, a leader of the party that newly dominated the legislature (and the party that
rarely enjoyed African American support) announced an intention to enact what he
characterized as an ‘omnibus’ election law.” (citation omitted)).
109 See id. at 225 (discussing a prior case where a three-judge court “held that race was the
predominant motive in [the state’s redistricting plan], in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause”).
110 See id. at 216 (describing the “number of voting restrictions” in the North Carolina law).
111 See id. at 222 (“Using race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to win an
election. But intentionally targeting a particular race’s access to the franchise because its
members vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory
purpose.”).
104
105

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 [2021], Art. 4

1576

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1553

North Carolina had intentionally violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.112 This was deemed the case
despite the state’s defense that it was engaging in an effort to
disenfranchise Democratic voters (who also happened to be in large
part African American).113
North Carolina certainly was not the only state to engage in a
post-Shelby County wave of heightened election regulation. Texas,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia all passed voter identification
laws almost immediately after the Court’s decision.114 Two cities in
Texas changed local representation rules that directly affected
Latino participation.115 And the city of Macon, Georgia moved the
date of city elections from November to July, when African
American turnout traditionally had been low.116 Moreover, a new
wave of voter qualification regulation took place in North Carolina,
Virginia, and, notably, outside of the old Section 5 area in
Wisconsin.117 Given the influence of the internet and the already
demonstrated impact that Russian election interference has had on
American elections—both in terms of targeting minority voters and
in manipulating the electorate along the axis of race118—the vistas
for manipulation and suppression of minority votes appear even
more clearly than they had in the last fifty years.

V. POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS
The voting rights paradox in a sense is the “invisible hand” that
shapes the nature of the right to vote in American democracy. This
Essay has sought to illustrate this reality by pointing out what is
obvious but not stated explicitly: that our democracy is shaped by

112 See id. at 219 (“We hold that the challenged provisions of [the North Carolina law] were
enacted with racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”).
113 Id. at 226.
114 See Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 92, at 2145–46 (outlining the timeline of these
laws’ enactments).
115 See id. at 2146 (describing the changes in Pasadena and Galveston County, Texas).
116 Id.
117 See Atiba R. Ellis, Economic Precarity, Race, and Voting Structures, 104 KY L.J. 607,
619–25 (2015) (describing litigation over these laws).
118 See generally Darin E.W. Johnson, Russian Election Interference and Race-Baiting, 9
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 191 (2019) (discussing the impact of Russian interference on U.S.
elections through the suppression of minority turnout and the stoking of racial division).
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ideological assumptions that inform and shape the structure of
election law. This Essay has explored this by looking specifically at
the most intractable problem of all: racial discrimination.
Yet Americans often pride themselves on the progress we have
made towards a universalist conception of the right to vote. Across
the ideological spectrum, this progressive vision of voting rights is
celebrated in varying degrees. Oftentimes, conservatives (like Chief
Justice Roberts in Shelby County) laud the elimination of formal
barriers to the right to vote but at the same time pass measures that
target voters who are politically opposed to them.119 The narrative
of progress has become another ideological tool that allows for
attention to be drawn away from the scope and severity of voter
suppression and, unsurprisingly, permits its continued impact.
Liberals celebrate progress while critiquing voter suppression,120
but in viewing the voting rights struggle as one of transforming
practices and eliminating particular patterns of suppression, they
treat the symptoms but do not necessarily embrace what might
actually cure this cycle of tyrannical majoritarianism. The
particulars of the debate concern the legislation designed to
suppress rather than the mechanisms that enable the suppression.
The cycle of contested rights thus perpetuates itself without taking
on the larger problem of how ideology informs this structure.
In this sense, there is both a dilemma of legal structure and a
problem of epistemic values. The legal and structural dilemma is
that, as this Essay shows, discrimination will continue to reinvent
itself through laws that separate the intention of the law from its
desired effects when given cover by heuristics, such as “election
integrity” and deference, due to the structure that allows deference
to the states and to local majorities bent on disenfranchising.121 This
deference is built into the structure of the U.S. Constitution,122
therefore harms can be policed via the VRA and the Equal

See supra notes 23, 106 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Erica Y. King, Florida Voters Approve Amendment to Restore Right to Vote for
Felons Who Have Served Their Time, ABC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:27 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/florida-voters-approve-amendment-restore-vote-convictedfelons/story?id=59019248 (discussing the restored of voting rights to Florida felons and praise
by Democrat officials for the initiative).
121 See, e.g., Cady & Glazer, supra note 49, at 225–27 (discussing the use of voter fraud as
a pretext for voter intimidation).
122 See supra notes 12, 73 and accompanying text.
119
120
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Protection Clause, but only in relatively limited circumstances.123
This perpetuates the paradox and enables suppression to continue.
This leaves us the question of how to break out of the cycle. Given
the defects of the structure, the only apparent way out is to
reimagine the constitutionalism of the right to vote in a way that
sets the doctrine on a more truly democratic footing.
I have argued in the past that a communitarian vision is needed
for this end.124 Scholars who have theorized about the right to vote
have recognized that voting rights are partly about the individual’s
right to participate and partly about a communitarian notion of
protecting the value that each of us shares in having a legitimate,
truly democratic version of the franchise.125 The need for an election
law structure more firmly rooted in democratic theory is an
intervention that will forestall the problems outlined here and
which will highlight the exclusionary, expressive, and
epistemological harms of voter suppression.
This begins with eliminating the core problem, which is the
voting rights paradox that allows those with an exclusionary
ideology to manipulate the franchise to achieve an exclusionary end.
This outsized control over the franchise effectively allows those with
power to own the democracy—whether they are given the cover of
majoritarianism or act as a minority who can, through procedure,
stymie the will of the majority.126 As history has shown us, this
ideology allows those in control to exclude the marginalized and
gives cover to its purveyors.127 Thus, the voting rights paradox can
be expressed in its simplest form: the democracy belongs to those
with power, and not to all of the people.
A communal vision that emphasizes the collective nature of
democracy to the exclusion of ideological forces that seek to shape
democracy for the benefit of a few is the only plausible response to
the paradox. Taking on exclusionary ideology is a necessary first
See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
Ellis, Tiered Personhood, supra note 9, at 489–92.
125 See, e.g., id. at 481 n.105.
126 As to this dilemma in particular, Terry Smith has described how antidemocratic
majoritarianism, under the guise of white grievance, has had a detrimental effect on
American democracy, particularly in the era of Trumpism. See generally TERRY SMITH,
WHITELASH: UNMASKING WHITE GRIEVANCE AT THE BALLOT BOX (2020) (discussing the
resurgence of antidemocratic majoritarianism motivated by white Americans’ fear and
resentment of strides towards racial equality).
127 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
123
124
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step because, without such considerations, the structures of the law
may yet be manipulated to achieve exclusionary ends. This is the
cycle of voting suppression that continues to repeat. These cycles of
history, as Gilda Daniels has described, persist because our
solutions do not imagine democracy broadly enough.128
Thus, the efforts to pass the For the People Act, which would
address issues like partisan gerrymandering and voter access, and
the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, which would
restore the Section 5 preclearance mechanism under a new Section
4(b) of the VRA, are good first steps.129 They would repair the system
and move us to a pre-Shelby County state of affairs. And, to the
extent that these measures address partisan gerrymandering and
similar problems, they advance the law of democracy in ways that
the Court has declined to recognize.130
However, at the time of this writing, ideological mechanisms
imperil these solutions before they have a chance to be passed into
law. Tactics like the filibuster in the U.S. Senate may allow the
conservative minority to stall these laws so that they do not get a
vote.131 And, even if those laws are passed, the deferential U.S.
Supreme Court may declare such laws unconstitutional under an

See Gilda R. Daniels, Voting Realism, 104 KY. L.J. 583, 586 (2015) (arguing that a need
for “voting realism” that recognizes the salience of racial subordination and a more
imaginative approach to achieving racial equality is necessary for voting rights generally);
Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 371–87 (2010) (arguing for stronger
constitutional protections of the right to vote).
129 See generally Wendy R. Weiser, Daniel I. Weiner & Dominique Erney, Congress Must
Pass the ‘For the People Act,’ BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/congress-must-pass-people-act
(describing the provisions of the For the People Act); Sonia Gill, Passage of the John Lewis
Voting Rights Advancement Act Is the First Step to Heal Our Democracy, HILL (Feb. 24, 2021,
5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/540381-passage-of-the-john-lewisvoting-rights-advancement-act-is-the (“To heal our democracy, lawmakers must begin with
affirmative legislation that confronts this legacy problem of our republic. That bill is the John
Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act.”).
130 See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that partisan
gerrymandering is a political question that the federal courts will not address).
131 See Devan Cole, Aileen Graef & Daniella Diaz, Manchin Defends Bucking Voting Rights
Bill and Digs in Against Eliminating the Filibuster, CNN (June 7, 2021, 9:54 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/06/politics/joe-manchin-for-the-people-act-voting-filibuster/
index.html (noting that at least one Democratic Senator will not support abolishing the
filibuster and will oppose the For the People Act but stating that this Senator supports
passing the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act).
128
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aggressively expansive doctrine that would make state legislatures
the sole arbiters of the voting mechanisms in a state.132
Realignment of the underlying ad hoc political philosophy at play
in the politics of worthiness for citizenship is necessary to promote
truly democratic values. It ought to be the case that the ability to
vote in America belongs to each citizen individually and to all
citizens collectively, and not to those who might have the advantage
of their political position to determine who is and who is not worthy.
This is, to use Derrick Bell’s phrase, “democratic domination” set
under the guise of neutral law of general applicability.133
Embracing such a philosophy in the law of democracy—and thus
addressing the paradox itself—may begin with the passage of a
Right to Vote Amendment in the U.S. Constitution that is based
upon notions of open access to the ballot. As Joshua Douglas has
explained, a number of states have such strictures in their
constitutions.134 But no such stricture exists in the U.S.
Constitution.135 Such a constitutional command would insulate the
right to vote from partisans seeking to manipulate the law to reflect
their version of worthiness. Uniform standards for voting rights
across the country based on this vision of liberal access could then
be articulated. The political consensus around weakening voting
rights for racial minorities could also be eliminated. Indeed, Gilda
Daniels argues for this broader approach through methods
grounded in the reality of racism and the need to affirmatively
address those problems through an explicit right to vote.136
However, this would require a consensus concerning the
collective knowledge we have about the right to vote. It would
require an epistemic realignment regarding what our democracy
seeks to accomplish and what we, as citizens, owe to each other in
our political community. By this, I mean that our ability to
effectively understand the nature and state of our democracy from
For a historical defense of the “independent state legislature doctrine,” see generally
Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State
Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1 (2020).
133 See supra note 44.
134 See Douglas, supra note 3, at 101 (“Forty-nine states explicitly grant the right to vote
through specific language in their state constitutions.”).
135 See id. (“In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, all fifty states provide explicit voting
protection for their citizens.”).
136 See Daniels, Voting Realism, supra note 128, at 600–01 (advocating for a more raceconscious approach to voter suppression).
132
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an objective point of view is a necessary corrective to addressing the
voting rights paradox.137 Indeed, in the United States in 2021, we
face an epistemic crisis where a substantial number of citizens
believe that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, despite the
complete lack of evidence of any voter fraud.138 The proliferation of
propaganda surrounding a “stolen election” represents a new form
of crisis in the right to vote and the ability of a voter fraud meme to
exercise what J.M. Balkin would call hermeneutic power—i.e., the
power to shift and shape understanding in order to manufacture a
crisis in democracy.139 And as recent justifications for stricter
regulations around voting laws suggest, it is this shaping of
understanding that fuels voter exclusion.
Yet, as this Essay (and my prior work) would suggest, this
problem of disinformation in American elections is nothing new.
The ideology of exclusion is the defining problem of the law of
democracy, and it has persevered in various forms throughout
American history.140 Only with the passage of the Voting Rights Act

I certainly take Daniels as advocating for a similar sense of addressing this problem
with collective understanding, specifically around the salience of race. See id. at 600 (“[I]t is
imperative that we do not choose to ignore race, but instead acknowledge it as a consideration
in naming societal wrongs and developing remedies.”). However, as this Essay has sought to
illustrate, even if race is foremost in our considerations regarding democracy, other categories
of identity and moral standing also serve as denominators of exclusion within the political
community of the United States. In this sense, the complete erasure of the paradox this Essay
complains of is the ultimate approach for reinforcing democracy.
138 The 2020 election concluded with baseless allegations proffered by then-President
Donald Trump and his supporters that rampant voter fraud caused the election of President
Joe Biden. See Jonathan Easley, Majority of Republicans Say 2020 Election was Invalid: Poll,
HILL (Feb. 25, 2021, 12:08 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/540508-majority-ofrepublicans-say-2020-election-was-invalid-poll (“About half of all Republicans said they
believe their votes were counted, while 42 percent said the system is corrupt and that their
vote ‘probably doesn’t get counted anyway.’”). This reflects the underlying epistemic crisis
regarding knowledge about the election and the electoral process. I provided an account of
this phenomena in prior work. See Ellis, supra note 5, at 773–76 (describing Donald Trump
as an amplifier of the meme of voter fraud leading up to the 2020 election season). The 2020
election, the subsequent voter fraud litigation, and the ultimate insurrection at the capital
were the logical outcomes of this voter fraud disinformation campaign.
139 J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem
of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 166–67 (1993). I take Balkin’s sense of hermeneutic
power as the ability for an idea to have such explanatory power over the scope of reality that
it diverts the believer from a sense of reality grounded in objective fact. The aftermath of the
2020 election certainly illustrates this power.
140 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
137
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in 1965 has American democracy constrained its discriminatory
understandings through the rule of law.141 But the hermeneutic
power of memes––coupled with the ability for the unfiltered
internet to rapidly spread disinformation––would seem to
circumvent this in twenty-first century America.142 This problem
poses a direct threat to democracy and provides an avenue for a
third generation of voter suppression—exclusion based on
disinformation—to come into existence.
Solutions to this problem are difficult to imagine. The free speech
issues involved here, as measured by current First Amendment
doctrine that allows core protection for political speech, may very
well be insurmountable.143 Disinformation and propaganda about
the right to vote lie at the heart of what is protected by the First
Amendment, and thus structural solutions that would circumvent
the effect of such speech would seem to be necessary. The
disinformation attack at the end of the 2020 election showed that
standards of evidence maintained by the courts that retain a
commitment to objective truth are the first line of defense.144
Imagining how that would transmit to the body politic generally—
through education, disclaimers, or exclusion of certain
disinformation from certain platforms—are efforts that have been
proposed recently,145 but they do not provide complete remedies to
141 See Daniels, Voter Deception, supra note 128, at 344–45 (“In the last half century, the
U.S. Congress has journeyed into the world of election administration on three distinct and
important occasions: the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).” (footnotes
omitted)).
142 See generally Ellis, supra note 5 (discussing the pervasiveness of the voter fraud meme).
143 At least within the context of actors speaking on behalf of the government, however,
Caroline Mala Corbin has proposed a remedy regarding the First Amendment concerns. See
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Unconstitutionality of Government Propaganda, 81 OHIO ST. L.J.
815, 815 (2020) (“This Article argues that government propaganda, although government
speech, ought to be regarded as covered by, and in violation of the Free Speech Clause.”).
144 See Rosalind S. Helderman & Elise Viebeck, ‘The Last Wall’: How Dozens of Judges
Across the Political Spectrum Rejected Trump’s Efforts to Overturn the Election (Dec. 12, 2020,
2:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-trump-election-lawsuits/2020/12/
12/e3a57224-3a72-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html (“Judges consistently found there was
no substantive evidence to support claims of fraud and irregularities — that Biden’s votes
were, in fact, legal votes.”).
145 Lori Ringhand has summarized proposals regarding digital literacy as a means to
combat the disinformation crisis concerning political speech. See generally Lori A. Ringhand,
First Amendment (Un)Exceptionalism: A Comparative Taxonomy of Campaign Finance
Reform Proposals in the United States and United Kingdom, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 (2020).
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the problem. Yet, the propagation of a communal vision for our
democracy, the belief that each of us owe it to each other to allow all
citizens to participate, might serve in itself as the counternarrative
necessary to preserve what we have.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to articulate the contours of the voting
rights paradox—that within American democracy, legislation from
antidemocratic premises that value the right to vote for some over
others continues influence our democratic practices. The paradox
represents a commitment to ideologically driven standards of
worthiness for admission to the franchise and the willingness of the
majority to allow propaganda to influence policy around the
question of who is worthy to participate in the franchise—i.e., who
is “worthy” of citizenship. This occurs despite appeals to America as
a democracy that rhetorically embraces equality of all citizens.
Ultimately, I believe it matters that we deconstruct this rhetoric
of worthiness as a fundamental barrier to the right to vote. The
ideology of worthiness allows for those in power marginalize others
in American democracy through the passage of laws that exclude
people merely because of their status—whether it be race, felon
status, or wealth—and the ability for propaganda to disparage
democratic practice in a way that claims to save it but actually
endangers it. Only a shift in our legal structure and a commitment
to a communitarian conception of the right to vote will transform
our democratic practice so all may participate freely and fairly.
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